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James michael Gilmer
The BaTTle of Kalavrye revisiTed
The Battle of Kalavrye, a military engagement in the civil war between 
Nikephoros III Botaneiates (r. 1078–1081) and Nikephoros Bryennios the 
Elder, took place in the Byzantine province of Thrace on the Halmyros 
River in 1078. Botaneiates and Bryennios had both rebelled against the 
previous emperor, Michael VII Doukas (r. 1071–1078); when Botaneiates’ 
rebellion succeeded in toppling Michael VII, Bryennios was invited by the 
new emperor to end his rebellion. When negotiations broke down, however, 
Botaneiates dispatched the young general Alexios Komnenos with a small 
army to end Bryennios’ rebellion by force.
We are fortunate to have not one but four sources that cover the details 
of this important battle: in chronological order of composition, Michael 
Attaleiates’ History1; John Skylitzes’ Continuation2; Nikephoros Bryennios 
1. Michaelis Attaliatae Historia, ed. E. TsolaKis (CFHB 50), Athens 2011 [hereafter 
Attaliatae Historia]; English transl. in: Michael Attaleiates, History, Trans. A. Kaldellis – d. 
Krallis, Washington D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library, 2012 [hereafter Attaleiates, 
History].
2. Ed. E. TsolaKis, Ἡ Συνέχεια τῆς Χρονογραφίας τοῦ Ἰωάννου Σκυλίτση, 
Thessalonica 1968 [hereafter Scyl. Cont. (TsolaKis)]; the text is reproduced in: Byzantium 
in the Time of Troubles: The Continuation of the Chronicle of John Skylitzes (1057–1079). 
Ιntroduction, translation and notes by E. mcGeer. Prosopographical index and glossary of 
terms by J.W. NesBiTT, Leiden: Brill, 2020 [hereafter Scyl. Cont. (mcGeer)]. While there is still 
some debate on the authorship of the Continuation [see for the details E. TsolaKis, Συνεχείας 
Συνέχεια, ByzSym 25 (2015), 115-142], mcGeer (Byzantium in the Time of Troubles, 4-11), 
reads the Continuation as the work of John Skylitzes and thus part of the Σύνοψις Ἱστοριῶν 
proper.
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the Younger’s Ὕλη Ἱστορίας3 [hereafter Hyle]; and Anna Komnene’s 
Alexiad4. Modern historians traditionally rely almost exclusively on the 
Hyle, an account written by the grandson of Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder 
and replete with detailed and dramatic commentary on the course of the 
battle. The Alexiad follows the Ηyle very closely, altering a scant few details 
that will be explored below. However, Attaleiates’ account of the Battle of 
Kalavrye is often overlooked and does not feature in any of the modern 
histories of the battle surveyed below5. While not radically different from the 
more detailed and dramatic account provided in the Hyle and the Alexiad, 
Attaleiates’ History suggests a fundamental shift in agency that would 
substantially change our assessment of Alexios Komnenos’ generalship and 
overall tactical preparations for the Battle of Kalavrye vis-à-vis the Hyle/
Alexiad account of this battle. 
Where were the Turks? This is the question which separates the 
four historical accounts of the Battle of Kalavrye that will be explored 
below. Modern accounts follow the Hyle closely and argue that a force of 
Turkish mercenaries dispatched by Nikephoros III Botaneiates arrived 
after the battle had already begun (and effectively been lost) and that 
the serendipitous arrival of reinforcements allowed Alexios Komnenos to 
reengage with Bryennios and defeat the rebel general. While the Hyle and 
the Alexiad diverge on Alexios’ role in deploying these mercenaries after 
their fortuitous arrival, both sources agree that a large force of Turkish 
mercenaries arrived after the battle had commenced6. Both Michael 
Attaleiates and the Continuation of Skylitzes, however, do not mention 
3. Nikephoros Bryennios, Material for a History, edition and french translation by P. 
GauTier, Nicephori Bryennii, Historiarum Libri Quattuor (CFHB 9), Brussels 1975 [hereafter 
Bryennios].
4. Annae Comnenae, Alexias, ed. D. reiNsch – a. KamBylis (CFHB 40), Berlin-New 
York 2000 [hereafter Alexias]; English translation: E.R.A SeWTer, The Alexiad, London: 
Penguin Classics, 1969; revised edition 2009 [hereafter Alexiad].
5. Scyl. Cont.’s account follows Attaleiates’ very closely, as shall be examined below. 
6. Cf. J. BirKeNmeier, The Development of the Komnenian Army: 1081–1180, Leiden: 
Brill, 2002, 58-59; J. haldoN, The Byzantine Wars, Cheltenham: Tempus, 2001, 127-133; L. 
Neville, Heroes and Romans in Twelfth-Century Byzantium: The Materials for History of 
Nikephoros Bryennios, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012, 126-129; N. ToBias, 
The Tactics and Strategy of Alexius Comnenus at Calavrytae, 1078, Etudes Byzantines 6, 
Pts. 1-2 (1979), 193-211. 
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the timely arrival of these mercenaries, suggesting instead that they had 
been cunningly concealed by Alexios Komnenos before the battle began and 
deployed deliberately when Bryennios’ forces were otherwise engaged.
Conflicting accounts of the tactics employed at the Battle of Kalavrye 
can easily be reconciled: Alexios Komnenos knowingly and deliberately 
spread misinformation regarding the location of his Turkish mercenaries. 
He then used the confusion this move generated to his advantage, placing 
his Turkish mercenaries in ambush positions and guiding his cautious 
adversary, Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder, into an ambush using a fighting 
withdrawal. Alexios’ tactics were misunderstood –perhaps intentionally– by 
one of our main sources for this battle, Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger7. 
The Hyle itself preserves evidence that supports such an interpretation of the 
tactics used by Alexios Komnenos at Kalavrye, reinforced by observations 
drawn from Michael Attaleiates’ contemporary account of the battle. The 
Turkish mercenaries were always there, despite Nikephoros’ account of their 
sudden arrival in the Hyle and despite modern historians’ preference for 
Nikephoros’ carefully constructed narrative.
THE ACCOUNT OF NIKEPHOROS BRYENNIOS THE YOUNGER
According to Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger, the Battle of Kalavrye 
began as a result of careless scouting operations. He records that Alexios 
Komnenos encamped beside the Halmyros River and Ἐκεῖσε τοίνυν 
στρατοπεδεύσας, οὔτε τάφρον ὤρυξεν, οὔτε ἐπήξατο χάρακα· ἐβούλετο 
γὰρ αὐτοῦ μὴν πολεμίων ἐφοδεύειν ἔφοδον καὶ τὴν νίκην κλέπτειν, εἰ 
οἷόν τε, καὶ γὰρ ἔμελλε μετ’ ὀλίγων μάχεσθαι πρὸς πολλοὺς στρατηγούς 
τε ἅμα γενναίους καὶ πολυπειροτάτους (“neither dug a trench nor placed 
stakes, for he wanted to watch over the approach of the enemy himself and 
to steal the victory if it were possible, for he was about to do battle with 
7. The way in which a battle was presented, and the degree to which a general followed 
or deviated from Byzantine tactics as they were expressed in the military manuals, was “due 
in part to the personal preferences of the authors, whether they wanted to praise the military 
leader in question” or not: T. G. Kolias, H πολεμική τακτική των Bυζαντινών: Θεωρία και 
πράξη, in: Tο εμπόλεμο Bυζάντιο (9ος-12ος αι.) [IBR/NHRF, International Symposium 4], 
Athens 1997, 157 (Translations by Z. sKiaThas). 
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a few men against many generals both brave and highly experienced”)8. 
Alexios then dispatched scouts who discovered Nikephoros Bryennios the 
Elder’s nearby camp in the plains of Kedoktos. Unfortunately for Alexios, 
καὶ γὰρ τῶν μετὰ τοῦ Κομνηνοῦ Ἀλεξίου Τούρκων τινὲς νύκτωρ ἀπιόντες 
ἐπὶ <τῷ> τὸ τοῦ Βρυεννίου στράτευμα κατασκέψασθαι τοῖς σκοποῖς 
ἐμπεσόντες ἑάλωσαν καὶ ἀχθέντες πάντα ἀπήγγειλαν (“some of the Turks 
in Komnenos’ army had marched out at night toward Bryennios’ army to 
spy on him and had fallen in with his scouts. The Turks were captured and, 
after being brought [to the camp], confessed all”)9. As a result both generals 
were aware of the location of the other, preventing Alexios from ambushing 
Bryennios’ forces as he had no doubt planned.
With Bryennios now aware that Alexios held the road to Constantinople 
with an imperial army, he proceeded to divide his forces into a traditional 
battle order. Bryennios commanded the center; his brother John Bryennios 
commanded the right wing, with Katakalon Tarchaneiotes commanding 
the left wing. Each division is estimated at about four to five thousand 
men. Beyond the left wing, Bryennios stationed a contingent of Pecheneg 
mercenaries at a considerable distance from the main body of the army10. 
Alexios was well aware that he was outnumbered, but ἐβούλετο τῷ πλήθει 
καὶ ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἐλαττούμενος ὁ δομέστικος τῶν Σχολῶν μὴ τόλμῃ 
μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μελέτῃ καὶ ἀγχινοίᾳ καταστρατηγῆσαι τῶν πολεμίων 
(“although his army was inferior to the multitude arrayed against him [he] 
planned to outgeneral the enemy not only by daring, but also with care, 
8. Bryennios, IV.5: 267; all translations from the Hyle are my own. Cf. Alexias, I.4: 19; 
Alexiad, I.4: 17. haldoN, The Byzantine Wars, 128, notes that Alexios’ choice to occupy the 
main road between Bryennios and Constantinople was a deliberately provocative move and 
forced a response from Bryennios. 
9. Bryennios, IV.6: 269.
10. Alexias, I.5: 20; Alexiad I.5: 18. Bryennios, IV.6: 269. These forces would have 
been used as ‘outflankers’ whose purpose would have been to slip past the enemy’s flank 
and attack enemy’s army from the side/behind; ToBias, Tactics, 201. Both Maurice and Leo 
VI recommend this tactic: The Taktika of Leo the Wise. Greek text –english transl. G. T. 
deNNis (CFHB 49), Washington 2010 [hereafter Leo VI], VII.34: 122; also Leo VI, XII.21: 
226. Compare Maurice, Strategikon, III.14: ed. G. T. deNNis, German transl. E. GamillscheG 
(cfhB 17), Wien 1981, 184; English transl. G. deNNis, Maurice’s Strategikon: Handbook of 
Byzantine Military Strategy, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984, 49. 
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and shrewdness”)11. Nevertheless, Alexios “concealed his whole army in the 
hollows” and decided to “conceal the enemy from his army” as his forces 
were badly outnumbered, and he was concerned that his men might rout 
at the approach of so large a force12. Nikephoros relates that Alexios was 
hesitant to engage in battle as he had received letters from Botaneiates the 
evening before κελεύοντα μὴ πολεμεῖν, ἀλλὰ μένειν τὴν ἔλευσιν τῶν ἄρτι 
πεμφθέντων πρὸς τῶν Τούρκων συμμάχων (“commanding him not to 
wage war, but rather to await the coming of an allied contingent already 
sent from the Turks”)13. Alexios was outnumbered; advancing aggressively 
while reinforcements were on their way would be reckless indeed.
Although he had been commanded not to engage in battle until 
reinforcements arrived, according to Nikephoros, Alexios believed he 
could win the battle through subterfuge. Consequently, Alexios deployed 
forces in concealed positions hoping to ambush the advancing rebels’ right 
wing and cause enough damage in that moment of surprise to turn the 
tide and precipitate a rout. Thus, when Ἐπεὶ γοῦν κατὰ τοὺς κοιλώδεις 
τόπους τὸ τοῦ Βρυεννίου γέγονε στράτευμα, καὶ τοὺς κατὰ δεξιὸν 
κέρας ταττομένους ὑπεδείκνυε καὶ χωρεῖν κατὰ τούτων σφοδρᾷ τῇ ῥύμῃ 
ἐκέλευε. Καταπηδήσαντες οὖν ὥσπερ ἀπὸ ἐνέδρας καὶ τῷ αἰφνιδίῳ τοὺς 
ἀντιπάλους καταπλήξαντες … (“Bryennios’ army came through the hollows, 
11. Bryennios, IV.5: 267. The verb (καταστρατηγεῖν) Bryennios uses here is the same 
verb he uses to describe Alexios’ plan to defeat Roussel in an earlier engagement in Alexios’ 
career. See below, note 36.
12. Bryennios, IV.7: 269-271: Ὁ δὲ Κομνηνὸς Ἀλέξιος, μαθὼν διὰ τῶν σκοπῶν 
ἐγγίζειν ἤδη τοὺς πολεμίους, τὸ μὲν στράτευμα ἅπαν ἐν κοιλάσι κατέκρυψεν, αὐτὸς δὲ 
ἐπὶ λόφον ἀνελθὼν κατεσκόπει τὰ ἐκείνων. Ἰδὼν δὲ πλῆθος καὶ διανοησάμενος μήπως οἱ 
ὑπ’ αὐτὸν τεταγμένοι πρὸ τοῦ προσβαλεῖν τούτους τοῖς πολεμίοις εἰς φυγὴν ἐξορμήσωσιν, 
ἐβουλεύσατο βουλὴν ἀρίστην ὁμοῦ καὶ συνετωτάτην, ὥστε μηδόλως καταφανεῖς γενέσθαι 
τῷ τούτου στρατεύματι τοὺς πολεμίους. (“When Alexios Komnenos learned through his 
scouts that the enemy were already approaching, he concealed his whole army in the hollows 
and, going up onto a crest, surveyed the doings of Bryennios’ men. When he saw how many 
men were arrayed against them he considered whether or not his men might send the enemy 
into flight, and he considered what would be the best plan for him to employ, and at the same 
time the most wise – that he might conceal the enemy from his army”). Anna has half of 
Alexios’ forces hidden in the hollows, while the other half were in plain view (Alexias, I.5: 
21; Alexiad I.5: 18).
13. Bryennios, IV.7: 271. Anna does not record this detail. 
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Komnenos unveiled the men arrayed against the right wing and ordered 
them to march against their enemies with violent force. This attack fettered 
Bryennios’ men as if by snares and many were struck down by this unseen 
blow …”)14. But their success was short lived; John Bryennios personally led 
a charge that rallied the troops of Bryennios’ shaken right wing and drove 
off Alexios’ ambushing force. 
At this point in the narrative Alexios found himself behind Bryennios’ 
lines with a small force of bodyguards and cut off from his own army. 
Nikephoros relates that Alexios considered a desperate ploy:  he would 
personally infiltrate Bryennios’ army, approach Bryennios himself and 
strike him down before he and his companions were themselves struck down 
by Bryennios’ retainers15. The success of this strategy hinged upon the vital 
role played by a general in the medieval army: without the general, even an 
otherwise victorious army often fled the field16. While Alexios considered 
this plan and was advised against it by his retainers, Bryennios’ left wing 
engaged with Alexios’ remaining troops and routed the rest of his army. With 
the battle essentially over, a division of Pecheneg mercenaries in Bryennios’ 
employ abruptly decided to plunder Bryennios’ camp and quit the field17. In 
the ensuing chaos Nikephoros narrates a dramatic scene: Alexios advanced 
alone and τῶν ἱπποκόμων ἕνα τοῦ Βρυεννίου καταβαλὼν <ἵππον τινὰ 
τῶν βασιλικῶν ἐπισυρόμενον> ἐκείνου τῇ ἁλουργῷ ἐφεστρίδι καὶ τοῖς 
χρυσοῖς φαλάροις κοσμούμενον <αἱρῶν> (“threw down one of Bryennios’ 
horse-grooms and dragged off one of Bryennios’ ‘imperial’ horses. He took 
14. Bryennios, IV.8: 271. Alexias, I.5: 21; Alexiad I.5: 18.
15. ToBias, Tactics, 206 argues that both Anna Komnene and Nikephoros Bryennios 
the Younger [as in previous note] present this dramatic episode as a means of highlighting 
Alexios’ personal bravery. Both Haldon and Neville accept Bryennios’ account of Alexios’ 
exploits at face value.
16. The leader is described as the “Achilles’ Heel” of the medieval army; killing him 
nearly invariably precipitates a rout among the surviving troops. E. mcGeer, Sowing the 
Dragon’s Teeth: Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth Century, Washington D. C.: Dumbarton 
Oaks Research Library, 2008, 307-308; ToBias, Tactics, 206. Cf. Leo VI, XIV.65: 330. 
17. Alexias, I.5: 22; Alexiad I.5: 20; Bryennios, IV.9: 273. Anna attributes this to the 
temperament of “the Scythian nation” –τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὸ ἔθνος τὸ Σκυθικὸν– just Scythians 
being Scythians. Cf. Leo VI, XVIII.45: 452.
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one which was adorned with a purple mantle and a golden bridle”) and 
loudly proclaimed that Bryennios himself had fallen18.
Having successfully rallied his remaining forces, Alexios’ good fortune 
continued when ξυνέπεσε δέ τι καὶ ἕτερον, Τούρκων οὐκ ἐλαχίστην μοῖραν 
πρὸς συμμαχίαν ἄρτι πρὸς βασιλέως ἀπεστάλθαι, οὓς συνεκύρησε κατὰ 
τὸν καιρὸν ἐκεῖνον καθ’ ὃν ἡ μάχη συνέστη καὶ ἡ τροπὴ παραγενέσθαι. 
Ἰδόντες οὖν φεύγοντας καὶ τὸν δομέστικον ζητήσαντες τῶν Σχολῶν καὶ 
παρὰ τούτῳ γενόμενοι θαρρεῖν τε ἐκέλευον καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ἐζήτουν 
θεάσασθαι (“chanced upon [a] large division of Turks which had just been 
sent by the Emperor according to his alliance with them. The Turks saw 
men fleeing and sought out Alexios. They came into his presence and urged 
him to take heart”)19. According to Nikephoros, the Turkish mercenary 
commanders then independently surveyed the battlefield from a nearby 
ridge. They decided among themselves to divide into three divisions; two 
were deployed in ambush positions, while a smaller third division advanced 
ahead as bait. The Turks attacked Bryennios’ forces –on their own initiative– 
then πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους χωρεῖν οὐ κατὰ φάλαγγα συντεταγμένους 
18. Bryennios, IV.9: 273; Alexias, I.5: 23; Alexiad, I.5: 19-20. To claim that an enemy 
general had fallen during a battle in order to bolster the morale of one’s own troops while 
undermining the morale of the enemy’s troops was a well-established ruse attested in Leo’s 
Taktika: Leo VI, XIV.97: 344. Note the usage of the same verb (καταστρατηγεῖν) in Leo’s 
tactical advice and Nikephoros’ account of Alexios’ intention to ‘outgeneral’ Bryennios. 
ToBias, Tactics, 207 suggests that Alexios may have used the confusion created by the 
withdrawing Pechenegs to exit Bryennios’ army, but this is unconvincing; see below, note 50.
19. Bryennios, IV.10: 275. Compare Alexias, I.6: 24; Alexiad I.6: 20: εἶτα ἡ τύχη 
ξυνέβαλε καί τι τοιοῦτον· ἀπόμοιρά τις ἐκ τῆς συμμαχίας τῶν Τούρκων καταλαμβάνει 
τὸν δομέστικον τῶν σχολῶν Ἀλέξιον, καὶ ὡς καθειστήκει τὰ τοῦ πολέμου μαθόντες …. 
ἐπὶ λόφου τινὸς συνεληλυθότες τῷ Κομνηνῷ Ἀλεξίῳ καὶ ἐμῷ πατρὶ ἐκείνου δεικνύντος 
τῇ χειρὶ τὴν στρατιὰν ἐθεῶντο τούτους ὥσπερ ἀπό τινος σκοπιᾶς (“Then fortune, too, 
contributed the following incident to Alexios’ success. A detachment of the Turkish allies 
happened upon Alexios … and on hearing that he had restored the battle … they accompanied 
him, my father, to a little hill, and when my father pointed out the army, they looked down 
upon it from an observation tower”). Haldon, Neville, and Tobias accept Nikephoros’ 
claim that Turkish reinforcements arrived by chance at this opportune moment; Neville, 
Heroes, 127-129, uses this detail to assert that Bryennios the Younger sought to diminish his 
grandfather’s defeat by removing Alexios’ agency in bringing about Bryennios the Elder’s 
battlefield loss, ascribing his defeat to Fate/the Turks, and not Alexios himself.
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ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόχους ὀλίγους καῖ διεσκεδασμένως, ἐλᾶν τε τοὺς ἵππους καὶ 
τοῖς τοξεύμασι χρῆσθαι καὶ πέμπειν βέλη συχνὰ κατ’ ἐκείνων (“to march 
against the enemy not in order but scattered according to plan and sought 
to assail the horses too with arrows, and to shower many missiles down upon 
those who pursued them”)20. In this second phase of the battle, Bryennios’ 
men are easily overcome. They are simply no match for the rapid sequence 
of blows to their morale: first the Pecheneg mercenaries desert; then the 
Pechenegs plunder Bryennios’ camp; then Alexios presents Bryennios’ horse 
and claims that Bryennios is dead; then the Turks emerge from nowhere and 
launch a disciplined ambush supported by showers of arrows. It is simply 
too much, and Bryennios’ men melt away. Bryennios himself is eventually 
overcome as well –by a Turkish mercenary– and surrenders21.
MICHAEL ATTALEIATES’ ACCOUNT
In contrast to Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger, Michael Attaleiates 
offers a much simpler, far more concise account of the Battle of Kalavrye. 
Preparations for the battle begin after negotiations between Botaneiates 
and Bryennios break down. Botaneiates then δυνάμεις ῥωμαϊκὰς ἐκ 
Κρήτης συναθροίσας εἰς τὸ πρὸ τῆς πόλεως πεδίον καὶ Τούρκους 
διαπεραιωσάμενος καὶ καταριθμήσας τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ στρατιώταις 
(“assembled troops from Crete in the plain before the City [Constantinople] 
and ferried Turks across the straits and enlisted them among his own 
soldiers”)22. Alexios Komnenos, assuming command of this force at 
Botaneiates’ command, marched against Bryennios’ advancing army. 
Alexios’ scouts encountered Bryennios’ forces while the army was encamped 
20. Bryennios, IV.10: 275. Neville, Heroes, 127-128; 186, argues that it is essential to 
Nikephoros’ narrative of this battle that the Turks decide for themselves how to deploy their 
forces. Their arrival is presented as an instrument of fate, and their tactical decisions must be 
their own in order to deny Alexios credit for the victory to follow. Anna Komene’s account 
(Alexias, I.6: 24; Alexiad I.6: 21) challenges Nikephoros’ on this point, emphasizing Alexios’ 
agency in directing the attacks of the Turks: καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν τῆς τοιαύτης διαταγῆς ἐς τὸν 
ἐμὸν πατέρα Ἀλέξιον ἀνεφέρετο.
21. Bryennios, IV.11–13: 275-279; Alexias, I.6: 24-26; Alexiad I.6: 20-22. 
22. Attaliatae Historia, 221; Attaleiates, History, XXXIV.4; 524. Scyl. Cont. (TsolaKis), 
180 = Scyl. Cont. (mc Geer), VII.3: 178, does not comment on the origins of these forces, only 
noting that Botaneiates gathered a force and placed Komnenos in command of it. 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 05:24:21 |
BYZANTINA ΣΥΜΜΕΙΚΤΑ 31 (2021), 153-175
161THE BATTLE OF KALABRYE REVISITED 
at Kalavrye. Alexios Τούρκους ἐξαποστείλας νυκτὸς ἐπιφανῆναι πρὸς 
ἡμέραν τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐκέλευσε καὶ φόβον ἐνσεῖσαι τούτοις καὶ ταραγμὸν 
ἐκ τῆς σκοπιᾶς φαντάζοντας πόλεμον καὶ οὕτω κατασεῖσαι μὲν τὰς τῶν 
ἀντιθέτων ψυχάς, ταραχὴν δὲ τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἐμποιῆσαι (“dispatched 
some Turks at night with orders to appear before the enemy during the day 
and put fear into them, to rattle them by giving their scouts the impression 
that they were seeking battle, and in this way to shake the enemy’s morale 
and fill their army with commotion”)23. In Attaleiates’ version of events, 
Alexios’ Turks succeed in their forays against Bryennios and τούτου δὲ 
γενομένου, οἱ μὲν τοῦ Βρυεννίου στρατιῶται ταράχου πλησθέντες τὰς 
ψυχὰς κατεσπάσθησαν, οἱ δὲ Τοῦρκοι πολλοὺς ἀποσπάδας καταβαλόντες 
κἀν τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ τοὺς Βρυεννίτας καταμοχλεύσαντες …. (“the soldiers 
of Bryennios were in fact thrown into disorder and their morale was shaken, 
while the Turks eliminated many of them who were detached from the main 
army, thereby disrupting the supporters of Bryennios ….”)24.
After some skirmishing of this nature, Alexios mustered his forces 
into battle order. Attaleiates narrates a straightforward engagement: 
Alexios and his forces advanced against Bryennios’, and when τὸ ἐνυάλιον 
ἀλαλαξάντων ἑκατέρων, πόλεμος συνέστη καρτερὸς καὶ ἐπίδοξος ... καὶ 
διὰ τοῦτο γέγονε φόνος ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολὺς καὶ φόβος οὔτι μικρός 
(“the battle cry was raised from the two sides, a strongly contested and 
glorious battle was joined … as a result, there was much killing on both 
sides and great terror everywhere”)25. Although Alexios’ forces were 
outnumbered they fought hard and gradually wore down the rebel army’s 
morale. Attaleiates relates that Bryennios’ Pecheneg mercenaries fled early, 
plundering Bryennios’ camp and then departing from the battlefield. At this 
point Attaleiates records that Bryennios himself and his retainers joined the 
23. Attaliatae Historia, 222; Attaleiates, History, XXXIV.4: 526; Scyl. Cont. (TsolaKis), 
180 = Scyl. Cont. (mc Geer), VII.3: 178. Incidentally, this accords well with Nikephoros 
Phokas’ injunction to harry an adversary who fields a larger and stronger army with raids 
and skirmishing to undermine his morale before a general engagement. Phokas, Praecepta 
Militaria , ed. –english transl. E. mc Geer [as in n. 16], IV.19: 50.
24. Attaliatae Historia, 222; Attaleiates, History, XXXIV.5: 526; Scyl. Cont. (TsolaKis), 
180 = Scyl. Cont. (mc Geer), VII.3: 178.
25. Attaliatae Historia, 223; Attaleiates, History, XXXIV.5: 528; Scyl. Cont. (TsolaKis), 
180 = Scyl. Cont. (mc Geer), VII.3: 178.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 05:24:21 |
BYZANTINA SYMMEIKTA 31 (2021), 153-175
162  JAMES MICHAEL GILMER
melee in an attempt to stabilize morale. As the fighting intensified, Alexios 
gave the signal and sprung an ambush: he had kept his Turkish mercenaries 
in hidden reserve until this point. They οἳ καὶ παρ’ ἐλπίδα φανέντες ἐπὶ 
τοῦ λόφου καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐπιχυθέντες καὶ τοῖς τοξεύμασι βάλλοντες 
ἐκ μέρους τοῦ τὸν λόφον ἐγκάρσιον ἔχοντος, τροπὴν αὐτῶν μετὰ τῶν 
συμπολεμούντων Ῥωμαίων εἰργάσαντο (“suddenly appeared on a hilltop, 
pouring down on the enemy while shooting their arrows…and, along with 
the Byzantines who were fighting with them, caused a rout”)26. Bryennios, 
cut off by the rout of his forces, was then surrounded and captured.
The main points of the Battle of Kalavrye as they are presented by 
Michael Attaleiates, Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger, and Anna 
Komnene are as follows: Alexios Komnenos is placed in command of an 
army of Byzantines, mercenaries, and Turkish auxiliaries; Alexios encamped 
at Kalavrye and dispatched scouts to harry Bryennios’ forces; a general melee 
ensues; the Pechenegs plunder Bryennios’ camp; there is an intervention by 
Turkish mercenaries; Bryennios’ forces rout and Bryennios is captured. Yet, 
while there is general agreement on the outlines of the battle, the particulars 
vary considerably with each chronicler. Were Alexios’ scouts successful in 
disrupting Bryennios’ forces? Did the imperial forces hold Bryennios at bay 
in a general melee, or were they routed after a failed ambush attempt? Under 
whose orders were the Turkish mercenaries operating? Most importantly, 
did Turkish mercenaries arrive serendipitously on the battlefield at Alexios’ 
hour of need or had they been present throughout the battle?
NIKEPHOROS BRYENNIOS THE ELDER
What do we know of Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder and his command 
style? Nikephoros and Attaleiates describes Bryennios as a cautious 
commander. He is mentioned by Attaleiates in connection with the Battle 
of Manzikert and the skirmishes that preceded that fateful battle, in which 
Attaleiates presents Bryennios as a cautious, even timid commander. 
Bryennios was commanded by the Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes (r. 1068 
–1071) to engage Turkish forces that were harrying the army’s foragers and 
26. Attaliatae Historia, 223-224; Attaleiates, History, XXXIV.6: 528-530 (Cf. below, p. 
171). Scyl. Cont. (TsolaKis), 180 = Scyl. Cont. (mc Geer), VII.3: 178. Scyl. Cont.’s account is 
much sparser in details but follows the same course of events narrated by Attaleiates.  
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servants. Bryennios at first engaged the Turks in skirmishing, but with 
mixed results. He sent to the emperor for aid and was initially rebuffed; 
eventually, however, Romanos dispatched a relief force under the command 
of Nikephoros Basilakes. When the Turks could still not be pinned down, 
Basilakes organized a cavalry charge against them. Bryennios followed 
at first with the bulk of the forces under their combined command, but 
eventually halted the advance. Basilakes, unaware that Bryennios was no 
longer near, advanced all the way to the Turks’ camp. There he was easily 
overpowered and captured27.
Bryennios’ decision to call a halt to the advance demonstrates his 
cautious command style. He would certainly have understood the Turks were 
notorious for employing the “Scythian Ambush” – a maneuver in which a 
portion of the army serves as bait, attacking a larger enemy force and then 
withdrawing in apparent terror28. Unwary commanders would follow the 
smaller force into an ambush and quickly find themselves under attack from 
all directions. Byzantine military manuals are replete with advice against 
advancing incautiously precisely because this tactic could be exceptionally 
effective at bringing Byzantine forces to disaster; both Maurice’s Strategikon 
and Leo’s Taktika emphasize the need for caution specifically when fighting 
adversaries who, like the Turks, rely upon horse archers29.
Bryennios may come across as callous in Attaleiates’ account of 
the preliminary skirmishes leading up to the Battle of Manzikert, but 
Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger paints a more generous portrait in 
the Hyle. In Nikephoros’ version of events, it is Basilakes who advances 
first against the Turks. Contrary to the established precepts of Byzantine 
military strategy, Basilakes charges headlong against the Turks30. His forces 
27. Attaliatae Historia, 120; Attaleiates, History, XX.16: 282; Cf. Scyl. Cont. (TsolaKis), 
146 = Scyl. Cont. (mc Geer), IV.8-10: 116-118. 
28. A tactic recommended for use by the Byzantines themselves, see among others, 
De velitatione, ed. G.T. deNNis, Three Byzantine Military Treatises [CFHB 25], Washington 
2009, XI: 184; Cf. also Leo VI, XIV.38: 310-312 and Leo VI, XVIII. 38, 452. Compare Maurice, 
Strategikon, IV.2, ed. deNNis (as in n. 10), 194; english trans. by deNNis (as in n. 10), 52-53.
29. Cf. Leo VI, XIV.7: 292 and Leo VI, XX.59: 556; Maurice, Strategikon, II.1; english 
trans. by deNNis (as in n. 10), 24.
30. E.g. Maurice, Strategikon, VIII. 1. xxii, ed. deNNis (as in n. 10), 272; english trans. 
by deNNis (as in n. 10), 81.
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lose all cohesion and sense of discipline and are easily baited into a Scythian 
ambush. Nikephoros then relates that Romanos dispatches Bryennios to 
rescue Basilakes, inverting Attaleiates’ narrative. Bryennios advances in 
good order, perceives that a Turkish force is poised to ambush him, and 
withdraws in good order31. In the Hyle, Bryennios is a disciplined and 
cautious commander who executes a difficult fighting withdrawal under fire; 
in the History, he is a cool, callous commander who calls off the advance 
before his forces can be drawn into an ambush while consigning the reckless 
Basilakes to his fate. Both accounts emphasize Bryennios’ caution – he is not 
a man who blunders recklessly into an ambush.
After the Battle of Manzikert, Bryennios drops off Attaleiates’ radar 
until his rebellion against Michael VII Doukas/Nikephoros III Botaneiates. 
Nikephoros, however, continues to follow Bryennios’ career and records 
that Bryennios was next appointed Doux of Illyrikon. While governor 
of the province Bryennios led an expedition against the Croatians and 
Diocleians in which Bryennios demonstrated his customary caution and 
good discipline. He deployed his soldiers throughout the lands he sought 
to subdue in fortified camps; when he needed to traverse mountain passes, 
Bryennios deployed axemen to clear the path ahead of the army so as not 
to be caught in an ambush launched from the heavily wooded terrain. In 
terrain where other, less cautious generals had often come to disastrous ends 
at the hands of sudden ambushes, Bryennios succeeded through patience 
and good sense32.
Bryennios –as he is presented by both Michael Attaleiates and 
Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger– was a cautious general who would not 
easily be lured into a trap. Both chroniclers attest that he avoided falling 
into an ambush by Turkish forces at Manzikert, and Nikephoros argues that 
Bryennios also avoided being ambushed by the Croatians and Diocleians in 
his Illyrian campaign. Both groups were notoriously adept at ambushing 
Byzantine forces, which serves to highlight Bryennios’ achievements. Yet I 
31. Bryennios, I.14 – I.15: 109-113. 
32. Bryennios, III. 3: 213-215. For other, less successful forays by the Byzantines into 
this territory, see also P. sTepheNsoN, About the Emperor Nikephoros and How He Leaves 
His Bones in Bulgaria: A Context for the Controversial  «Chronicle of 811», DOP 60 (2006), 
87-109. 
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will argue below that he met his match in Alexios Komnenos, and that the 
Battle of Kalavrye was a carefully constructed ambush designed to ensnare 
even the highly cautious Bryennios. 
ALEXIOS KOMNENOS
Much of what we know about Alexios Komnenos as a general derives from 
the same four sources that describe the Battle of Kalavrye: the History of 
Michael Attaleiates, the Synopsis Historion and Continuation of John 
Skylitzes, the Hyle Historias of Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger, and 
the Alexiad of Anna Komnene. Throughout all four chronicles, Alexios 
Komnenos is portrayed as a remarkably consistent general who employs the 
same sorts of tactical devices again and again throughout his career. This 
is especially true of Alexios’ early campaigns, during which he routinely 
commanded numerically inferior forces against stronger enemies. 
Alexios’ campaign against the Frankish mercenary-gone-rogue Roussel 
provides a case in point. Nikephoros Bryennios provides a lucid account of the 
tactics employed by Alexios in suppressing Roussel’s separatist campaign. 
Alexios, accompanied by a small retinue, encountered a ‘handful’ of Alan 
mercenaries –a force of about 150 men– who were leaderless survivors of 
previous campaigns to suppress Roussel’s rebellion33. Alexios incorporated 
these men into his expeditionary army, and then dispatched some of his 
forces to plunder the regions under Roussel’s control while himself concealed 
33. Bryennios, II.20: 185. Michael Attaleiates does not provide a narrative of these 
events, leaving us completely dependent upon Bryennios’ account. Attaleiates’ account does 
corroborate Bryennios’, however, in that Attaleiates relates that Alexios was considered 
worthy of a later command by the Emperor Nikephoros III Botaneiates because he had 
“cunningly apprehended Roussel in the Armeniac thema and safely brought him back” to 
Constantinople (ὃς τὸν Ρουσέλιον ἐν τῷ θέματι τῶν Ἀρμενιακῶν εὐμηχάνως ἐχειρώσατο 
καὶ διέσωσεν εἰς τὴν βασιλεύουσαν (Attaliatae Historia, 222; Attaleiates, History, XXXIV.4: 
526). Skyl. Cont. also presents Roussel’s capture as the result of cunning diplomatic efforts 
by Alexios, rather than military action, with Alexios arranging for Roussel’s capture by 
the Turks through judicious use of bribery [Scyl. Cont. (TsolaKis),160-161; Scyl. Cont. 
(Mc Geer),VI.9: 144]. See a detailed report of the facts in relation to Roussel’s end in G. 
leveNioTis, To στασιαστικό κίνημα του Ουρσελίου (Ursel de Bailleul) στην Μικρά Ασία 
(1073–1076), Thessalonica 2004, esp. 169 ff. 
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with a larger division waiting in ambush34. When Roussel dispatched men 
to challenge the raiders, they fled and were eagerly pursued by Roussel’s 
men; the raiders withdrew, with Latin mercenaries close behind, to the point 
Alexios had chosen as an ambush site35.
While ambushes provided Alexios a useful tool in thinning Roussel’s 
numerical superiority and undermining the confidence of his opponent, 
Alexios was still badly outnumbered. So, he decided to turn Roussel’s 
advantage –greater numbers– into a disadvantage. Alexios’ men, in addition 
to drawing unwary Latin mercenaries into ‘Scythian’ ambushes, began to 
target Roussel’s foragers. Over time the rogue mercenary commander ran 
short of supplies. Roussel determined to march against Alexios with his entire 
force: ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀξιόμαχον ἔχων δύναμιν ἐβούλετο μάχῃ μιᾷ κριθῆναι 
τὰ κατ’ αὐτόν, ὁ δὲ στρατοπεδάρχης δυνάμεως ἀπορῶν καταστρατηγεῖν 
τὸν βάρβαρον ἔσπευδε, καὶ ὁπηνίκα ἐκεῖνος τὸ ἑαυτοῦ συνήθροιζε 
στράτευμα, οὗτος ἠρεμεῖν προσεποιεῖτο καὶ διασχὼν ἡμέρας τινὰς 
ἐξῄει λάθρᾳ καὶ τοὺς <τὰ ἀναγκαῖα> ἐπὶ τὸ στράτευμα διακομίζοντας 
ἐζώγρει (“for he, having a battle-ready force, wanted the matter settled with 
one battle, while Alexios, because he lacked a strong force, made haste to 
outgeneral the barbarian. Whenever Roussel gathered his own army, Alexios 
feigned quietude, but after a few days he would go out secretly and set up 
traps not far from Roussel”)36. Gradually, Alexios’ raids and ambushes wore 
Roussel and his forces down and Alexios returned to Constantinople with 
Roussel as his prisoner37.
34. Alexios’ tactics follow those recommended in the handbook on border defense, the 
De Velitatione Bellica (as in n. 28), X: 174-175: καὶ εἰ μὲν εὐχερές ἐστι τῷ στρατηγῷ τοὺς 
ἐς τὴν λείαν ἐκδραμόντας διεσκεδασμένους καταλαβεῖν καὶ τούτους κατατροπώσασθαι 
(“If it can be done easily, the general should attack the men who have ridden out to plunder 
while they are scattered, and he will make them turn to flight”). Gradually this would prevent 
an adversary from remaining in the field, as supplies would eventually run out. See also De 
Velitatione Bellica, XXII: 226.
35. Bryennios, II.20: 185.
36. Bryennios, II.20: 185. Emphasis mine. The verb (καταστρατηγεῖν) Nikephoros uses 
here will be the same verb he uses to describe Alexios’ plan to defeat Nikephoros Bryennios 
the Elder; see above, note 11.
37. Anna Komnene (Alexias I.2: 13; Alexiad, I.2: 11) reports that Roussel 
πολλάκις ὑπὸ τοῦ στρατοπεδάρχου στενοχωρούμενος καὶ ἄλλα ἐπ’ ἄλλοις φρούρια 
ἀφαιρούμενος (καίτοι στρατιὰν πολλὴν ἐπαγόμενος καὶ πάντας λαμπρῶς καὶ γενναίως 
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Alexios emerges from Nikephoros’ narration of these events as a shrewd 
general who knew how to outmaneuver a stronger opponent and carry 
the day through cunning and intelligence. Nikephoros provides a further 
example of Alexios’ military cunning in his account of John Bryennios’ 
siege of Constantinople in the late 1070s. He relates that John advanced 
against Constantinople at the head of a sizeable contingent loyal to John’s 
brother, Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder. John sought to seize control of the 
capital in his brother’s name; Michael VII Doukas, the reigning emperor, 
organized a resistance under the joint command of Alexios Komnenos and 
Michael’s younger brother Constantine Doukas. Alexios and Constantine 
organized a garrison from new recruits and their own personal retainers 
and braced to weather a lengthy siege. Alexios happened to notice a group 
of foragers departing from John’s camp during one of his patrols. He quickly 
assembled a band of followers and attacked John’s foragers, capturing twenty 
men and withdrawing behind the safety of the walls of Constantinople 
before the rebels could rally in pursuit38. Michael VII lavished praise upon 
Alexios for his boldness and tactical savvy in launching an attack on John’s 
foragers, thus endangering the rebel’s ability to supply himself and his 
army. Nikephoros relates that John abandoned the siege shortly thereafter, 
attributing this directly to Alexios’ battlefield successes. He also notes that 
John Doukas, the Kaisar and Emperor Michael Doukas’ uncle, arranged a 
marriage alliance with Alexios at this point, having recognized the young 
general’s talents and having decided that Alexios would make a useful ally39.
While the Battle of the Vardar River (c. 1078) – a contest which 
pitted Alexios Komnenos against Bryennios the Elder’s old colleague from 
Manzikert and fellow rebel against the crown, Nikephoros Basilakes – follows 
the Battle of Kalavrye and is not chronologically next, a close examination 
of this battle will demonstrate two things: first, that Alexios Komnenos 
employed remarkably consistent tactics throughout his career; and second, 
καθωπλισμένους, εὐμηχανίᾳ παρὰ πολὺ ἡττᾶτο τοὐμοῦ πατρὸς Ἀλεξίου (“was often 
hard pressed by the general [Alexios], and losing one fortress after another in spite of his 
large army and his men being excellently and generously equipped, because in ingenuity he 
was far surpassed by my father Alexios”). Emphasis mine. 
38. Alexios’ tactics in this engagement closely parallel those he employed successfully 
against Roussel in Anatolia; see above, n. 34.
39. Bryennios, III.13: 235.
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that Michael Attaleiates’ and Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger’s histories 
largely confirm one another when political biases are not at play40. Attaleiates 
relates that Alexios marched against Basilakes, setting up camp on the road 
to Thessalonike at the banks of the Vardar River41. Nikephoros adds that 
Alexios dispatched scouts who encountered Basilakes’ army on the move; 
once Alexios realized that the rebel was aware of his presence and intended 
to launch a night raid on his camp, Alexios began preparing for Basilakes’ 
arrival42. All four chroniclers relate that Alexios created a trap for Basilakes’ 
advancing forces43. Nikephoros elaborates on Attaleiates’ terse description, 
relating that Alexios concealed his army and that the general entrusted his 
camp servants generally and a faithful monk companion specifically with 
the task of remaining in camp with torches and campfires blazing while 
the army itself concealed themselves in a “thickly covered place”(εἰς τινα 
συνηρεφῆ τόπον εἰσῄει)44. 
When Basilakes arrived, his men easily occupied Alexios’ camp. They 
proceeded to search, rather comically in Nikephoros’ description of the 
events, for Alexios for some time45. With Basilakes’ men scattered and off 
their guard, Alexios marshalled his concealed forces and charged headlong 
back into his abandoned camp, taking Basilakes and his men unawares. A 
running fight ensued in which Alexios and his forces gained the upper hand 
40. Attaleiates, as a partisan of Nikephoros III Botaneiates, fervently disliked 
Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder for his rebellion against Nikephoros III Botaneiates. 
Conversely, Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger strove to maintain a delicate balance of 
allegiances:  he was married to Anna Komnene, the daughter of Alexios Komnenos, and 
himself the grandson of Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder.
41. Ἐκ τινος δὲ διαστήματος τὸν χάρακα θεὶς ἀντιπέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ τοῦ λεγομένου 
Βαρδαρίου (Attaliatae Historia, 230; Attaleiates, History, XXXV.7: 546).
42. Bryennios, IV.20: 287-289, Attaliatae Historia, 230; Attaleiates, History, XXXV.7: 
546. Alexias, I.7: 28-29. Alexiad, I.7: 25.
43. Alexios appears to have employed a ruse, frequently mentioned in Byzantine 
handbooks as a means of enabling a cover withdrawal from a stronger adversary, with the 
intention of creating a trap rather than covering a retreat. Cf. Leo VI, XX.21: 544; Maurice, 
Strategikon, VIII.1.xxvii: ed. deNNis  [as in. n. 10], 274; translation deNNis [as in. n. 10], 84, a 
stratagem going back to Onasander X.12.
44. Bryennios, IV.21: 289.
45. Anna quotes Aristophanes, noting that Basilakes would not stop “groping about in 
darkness.” Alexias, I.8: 30; Alexiad, I.8: 26.
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despite their inferior numbers. Nikephoros and Attaleiates both record a 
personal confrontation between Alexios and Basilakes; both assert that 
Basilakes fled the battlefield after losing the majority of his men46.
What emerges is a portrayal of Alexios Komnenos as a general who 
consistently utilizes tactics designed to throw an adversary off-balance. 
This combination of ambushes, feints, flanking maneuvers, and other ‘tricks’ 
became Alexios’ signature style of generalship throughout his career. There 
is a remarkable degree of consistency among our four principal sources – 
Michael Attaleiates, John Skylitzes, Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger, and 
Anna Komnene – that Alexios fought in this manner. Nikephoros’ account of 
the Battle of Kalavrye thus represents an outlier. Would Alexios attack with 
an inadequate force, knowing that his adversary was advancing to battle 
confident in his numerical superiority and aware of Alexios’ presence? To 
do so would be reckless and foolish in equal measure:  Alexios consistently 
defeated his adversaries by utilizing the element of surprise, whittling 
away at an adversary’s morale through ambushes and attrition when badly 
outnumbered. Is it not more likely that he would conceal an important 
piece of information and a portion of his army to gain an advantage over 
Bryennios, as he was later to do at the Battle of the Vardar River?
If we instead approach the Battle of Kalavrye under the assumption 
that Alexios Komnenos employed the same sort of tactics that he had 
utilized earlier in his career against Roussel and John Bryennios – tactics, 
moreover, which he was to employ later in his career against Basilakes, e.g. 
– then we must reevaluate the account provided by Nikephoros Bryennios 
the Younger in the Hyle Historias. Nikephoros, as has been demonstrated 
persuasively by Leonora Neville, emphasizes the role of chance in this battle 
in a deliberate attempt to present Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder as a 
general of similar caliber to Alexios Komnenos47. Nikephoros’ account of 
46. Bryennios, IV.24–IV.26: 293-295. Attaliatae Historia, 230; Attaleiates, History, 
XXXV.7: 546. Alexias, I.8-9: 30-34. Alexiad, I.8-9: 26-29.
47. See above, note 20. Neville, Heroes, 116-119, argues that Nikephoros strove to 
undermine Alexios’ credibility as a talented general by ascribing the crucial intervention of 
Alexios’ Turkish contingents to their chance arrival and willingness to engage in what was 
otherwise a lost cause. However, this reading is not consistent with Nikephoros’ portrayal of 
Alexios throughout the remainder of the Hyle, in which he appears as a skilled commander 
who is usually in control of the situation. The Battle of Kalavrye is a lone exception and 
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the battle is problematic, however, as he presents an Alexios who offers 
battle seemingly without a concrete plan48. Nikephoros relates that Alexios 
launched a concealed ambush on Bryennios’ right flank, but that this 
maneuver was easily repelled when John Bryennios rallied his rattled forces49. 
With his forces dispersed, we are told that Alexios proceeds to consider 
several daring stratagems: however, we are not told how Alexios and his 
personal retinue find themselves behind Bryennios’ lines and in a position 
to infiltrate the rebel’s army. Nikephoros provides a dramatic account of 
Alexios’ planned assassination attempt on Bryennios, a stratagem which he 
is dissuaded from attempting by his retinue and the serendipitous departure 
of Bryennios’ Pecheneg mercenaries. 
However, this dramatic account is suspect and does not appear 
in Attaleiates’ account of the battle50. Instead, Attaleiates narrates a 
departure from Alexios’ usual tactics – and is, not coincidentally, a battle which Nikephoros 
Bryennios the Younger has an emotional investment in and a compelling reason to present 
a biased account of. 
48. Bryennios, IV.7: 269-271 (See n. 12 above). Consider the irony of this situation: 
Alexios is concealing the enemy from his own army, a dramatic reversal of his habitual 
approach – namely, to ambush the enemy by concealing his own army from the enemy. 
Phokas, whom Alexios’ ancestors studied under Basil II and Alexios himself likely also 
studied, counseled indirect warfare when confronted by a stronger foe. See n. 23 above. For 
the Komnenoi family’s ties to Basil and military training, see also Bryennios, Hyle, I.1: 75. 
That the Byzantine military aristocracy was well-versed in the military manuals described 
throughout has been well established by others, e.g. Kolias [as in n. 7], 157; K. J. SiNcKlair, 
War Writing in Middle Byzantine Historiography: Sources, Influences and Trends (PhD 
Dissertation, University of Birmingham, 2012), 23.
49. Bryennios, IV.8:271. Incidentally, this account of the battle presents John Bryennios 
in a very positive light. He emerges as a dashing, dauntless commander who deflects a 
prepared ambush and then proceeds to rout the forces arrayed against him – a role which 
he does not play in Attaleiates’ account of the same battle. Nikephoros’ biases are readily 
apparent.
50. Alexios appears to have favored a direct approach to generalship, fighting on the 
front lines of several engagements later in his career. Are we to believe that the battle passed 
him by, and that he found himself behind Bryennios? That he was then able to infiltrate 
Bryennios’ army unnoticed, steal a warhorse, and emerge unscathed on the opposite side 
of Bryennios’ forces? Nikephoros would also have us believe that Bryennios’ scouts easily 
detected and apprehended Alexios’ Turkish scouts the day before the battle … yet they 
managed to miss the imperial commander as he marched through their lines? In fact, R. 
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straightforward engagement between the two armies. Bryennios’ Pecheneg 
mercenaries broke first, looting Bryennios’ camp as they departed51. As the 
fighting intensified, Attaleiates relates that Bryennios himself entered the 
fray52. It was too late: Alexios “gave a signal to his unit of Turks, whom he 
had kept in reserve for use in a moment of need, ordering them to assist 
his men. They suddenly appeared on a hilltop, pouring down on the enemy 
while shooting their arrows… [which] caused a rout”53. It is significant that 
J. lilie [Reality and Invention: Reflections on Byzantine Historiography, DOP, 68 (2014), 
179-180], argues that the riderless horse prompting panic among partisans of a general and 
precipitating a rout is a common trope in Byzantine historiography. Medieval soldiers did 
panic if their general fell in battle –or was perceived to have fallen– and this could lead to 
defeat for an otherwise successful army.
51. Attaliatae Historia, 223; Attaleiates, History, XXXIV.5: 528. Compare Nikephoros’ 
account (Bryennios IV.9: 273): Κατὰ δὲ τὸ εὐώνυμον οἱ περὶ Κατακαλὼν τὸν Ταρχανειώτην 
Σκύθαι ἰδόντες Χωματηνοὺς εὐθὺς ἐξώρμησαν κατ’ αὐτῶν ξὺν βοῇ πολλῇ καὶ ἀλαλαγμῷ 
καὶ θᾶττον ἢ λόγος τούτους τρεψάμενοι, τοῦ διώκειν παυσάμενοι, σὺν τάξει ὑπέστρεφον 
καὶ κατὰ τῶν τὴν οὐραγίαν τηρούντων <τοῦ> τοῦ Βρυεννίου στρατεύματος ἐξώρμων 
σὺν προθυμίᾳ πολλῇ καὶ ὅσον θητικὸν σκυλεύσαντες καὶ ἵππους καὶ λάφυρα λαβόντες 
ἀπῄεσαν οἴκαδε (“The Scythians around Katakalon Tarchaneiotes saw the Chomatenes 
and straightaway charged forth against them with a great shout and a war cry; they then 
turned away swifter than thought, breaking their pursuit. Just as quickly, they turned back 
in good order against those guarding the rear of Bryennios’ army. They surged forth with 
great spirit and despoiled Bryennios’ camp and, taking their horses and spoils, they left the 
battlefield.”). In the Hyle, the Pechenegs’ motives are obscure and attributed to chance – part 
of Nikephoros’ wider commentary on the battle as a whole and therefore suspect as it serves 
Nikephoros’ narrative argument and does not objectively make sense in light of the facts 
presented by the chronicler.
52. Bryennios’ decision to avoid the melee until absolutely necessary accords well with 
the injunctions of Byzantine military manuals, which advise the general not to engage unless 
absolutely necessary. E.g. De Velitatione Bellica [as in n.28], XVI; 202. 
53. Attaliatae Historia, 223-224; Attaleiates, History, XXXIV.6: 530: σύνθημα δοὺς 
τοῖς τὸν λόχον ἔχουσι Τούρκοις ὁ Κομνηνός, οὓς εἰς καιρὸν ἀπεκρύψατο χρείας, 
παραβοηθῆσαι τοῖς οἰκείοις προσέταξεν· οἳ καὶ παρ’ ἐλπίδα φανέντες ἐπὶ τοῦ λόφου 
καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐπιχυθέντες καὶ τοῖς τοξεύμασι βάλλοντες ἐκ μέρους τοῦ τὸν λόφον 
ἐγκάρσιον ἔχοντος, τροπὴν αὐτῶν μετὰ τῶν συμπολεμούντων Ῥωμαίων εἰργάσαντο. 
Emphasis mine. (Cf. also above, p. 162). Note that the Turkish mercenaries are assumed to 
have been present throughout, contra Nikephoros. Cf. Bryennios, IV.10: 275, above, p. 159 
and n. 19.
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Attaleiates’ account emphasizes that the Turks were always present on the 
field of battle; they attack at a prearranged signal from Alexios54.
The Battle of Kalavrye, then, emerges as an example of Alexios’ favored 
tactic: a “Scythian Ambush”55. Although Nikephoros’ account of the battle 
is overly sensationalized and biased in favor of the Bryennioi, the basic 
outline of events –a short engagement between imperial and rebel troops, 
from which the imperial troops withdrew– accords well with what we know 
of the relative strength of each army. The crucial moment of the battle is the 
intervention of the Turks in an unexpected attack on Bryennios’ lines; this 
attack precipitated a rout of Bryennios forces. Attaleiates is undoubtedly 
correct in asserting that this was an ambush commanded by Alexios 
Komnenos himself; however, it is difficult to believe that Alexios and his 
men, outnumbered though they were, were fighting Bryennios to a standstill 
– let alone winning the fight alone, as Attaleiates seems to imply. Alexios 
knew that he could not win a straight fight, so he never intended to fight 
one. Furthermore, it is highly improbable that Alexios could have rallied his 
scattered forces on the very day of the battle for a counterattack. Byzantine 
military manuals routinely advise against immediately resuming an attack 
– the expectation was that defeated troops would need time to recover their 
resolve and will to fight56.
54. This is implied in Nikephoros’ own account of the preparations leading up to the 
battle:  Ἐξῄει οὖν ὁ Κομνηνός, σχὼν μεθ’ ἑαυτοῦ τούς τε ξυμμάχους Τούρκους καὶ τοὺς 
Χωματηνοὺς λεγομένους, … , καὶ Φράγγων τῶν ἐξ Ἰταλίας ἐλθόντων ἀπομοιράν τινα καὶ 
τῆς τῶν Ἀθανάτων καλουμένων φάλαγγος ἐπαγόμενος (“Then Alexios Komnenos was sent 
forth, taking with him the allied Turks, hand-picked Chomatenes … Franks coming from 
Italy and a division of the ‘Athanatoi.’”). Bryennios, IV.4: 265. Attaleiates corroborates this 
reading, noting that the Emperor Nikephoros III Botaneiates gathered δυνάμεις ρωμαϊκὰς 
ἐκ Κρήτης … καὶ Τούρκους διαπεραιωσάμενος καταριθμήσας τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ στρατιώταις, 
οὓς ὁ πρὸ αυτοῦ βασιλεὺς ὁ Μιχαὴλ πολλαῖς ἐπαγγελίαις καὶ δώροις ἀμέτροις οὐκ 
ἠδυνήθη συμπεῖσαι καὶ περαιῶσαι ... “forces from Crete … and ferried Turks across the 
straits and enlisted them among his own soldiers, those whom the previous emperor Michael 
had failed to persuade to be ferried across to the western parts despite his many promises 
and countless gifts.” Attaliatae Historia, 221; Attaleiates, History, XXXIV.4: 524; see above, 
p. 160 and note 22. 
55. See above, note 28.
56. Leo VI, XIV.14-15: 308.
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Instead, Alexios baited Bryennios into an ambush. This was likely 
accomplished through planned ‘defections’: Nikephoros alleges that 
Bryennios captured some of Alexios’ Turkish scouts before the battle. 
Could this have been deliberate? We know that Byzantine military manuals 
recommended this type of stratagem; we know that Alexios was fond 
of employing stratagems; we further know that Bryennios had avoided 
being drawn into a Scythian-style ambush before, namely at the Battle of 
Manzikert57. If Alexios dispatched his Turkish mercenaries some distance 
from his army and then spread word that they were not present but still 
some distance off, and Bryennios should have learned this from Alexios’ 
‘captured’ Turkish scouts, Bryennios could have advanced confident that 
his forces outnumbered those arrayed against him. This reading of the 
chronicle evidence has the advantage of reconciling Alexios’ otherwise 
uncharacteristic battle plans at Kalavrye with what is recorded of his tactics 
in both earlier and later campaigns. Alexios employed nearly identical 
tactics against Basilakes; furthermore, this reading of Alexios’ tactics at 
Kalavrye accords well with Attaleiates’ account of the battle. Moreover, we 
can safely assume that any discrepancies in the two accounts emerge from 
Nikephoros’ partiality toward his ancestors: after all, Nikephoros could 
hardly report that his grandfather had been duped by Alexios Komnenos 
and led into a trap58.
57. This type of stratagem is frequently recommended in Byzantine military manuals 
and derives from the stratagems of Polyaenus. The Byzantines were particularly fond of 
Polyaenus, whose works they frequently copied, abridged, and incorporated into larger 
works like Leo’s Taktika. For Polyaenus in Byzantium, see F. TromBley, The Taktika of 
Nikephoros Ouranos and Military Encyclopaedism, in Pre-modern Encyclopaedic Texts: 
Proceedings of the Second COMERS Congress, Groningen, 1-4 July (1996), 261-274. For 
Byzantine recommendations to utilize this type of stratagem: Leo VI, XX.15: 542; (Leo is 
citing Maurice, Strategikon, VIII.1.xi). Ultimately this advice derives from Polyaenus II.1.iii. 
Cf. Leo VI, XX.8; 540 (Leo is citing Maurice, Strategikon, VIII.1.viii).
58. If we are generous, it is even possible that Nikephoros misunderstood the accounts 
from which he composed his history; feigned withdrawals were notoriously difficult for 
chroniclers to recognize, and what is presented as a general rout here may well have been 
a deliberate and calculated withdrawal designed to draw Bryennios’ forces into an ambush. 
However, it is unlikely that a member of the military aristocracy –steeped in the military 
manuals, as we have seen above– would have misidentified such a tactic unintentionally. See 
above, notes 7 & 48.
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CONCLUSION
Alexios Komnenos deployed Turkish mercenaries in a concealed ambush at 
the Battle of Kalavrye. This maneuver won him the battle. The conflicting 
accounts regarding Alexios’ Turkish scouts, who were either captured by 
Bryennios’ men or who harassed Bryennios’ beleaguered forces at will, 
represent a misunderstanding of Alexios’ tactics: a ruse, designed to lure 
Bryennios into battle and then spring an ambush using troops that were ‘not 
there’ at the start of the battle. Alexios prompted Turkish soldiers within 
his army to ‘defect’ –or, perhaps, simply to get themselves caught– and to 
provide Bryennios with seemingly trustworthy information about Alexios’ 
army and its disposition. Bryennios, believing that Alexios’ forces were less 
numerous than they actually were and that Alexios was awaiting substantial 
reinforcements, chose to attack immediately and force the road. This was 
an uncharacteristically bold move by Bryennios, as I have demonstrated 
above, and would have required prompting – of the sort provided by 
defectors peddling the information suggested above. It then remained only 
for Alexios’ main forces to fight a delaying action, serving as the bait in a 
drawn out fighting withdrawal until Alexios’ Turkish mercenaries could be 
mobilized in an ambush. These forces were always present on the battlefield, 
despite Nikephoros’ claims of their serendipitous arrival – these are the 
arguments of a devoted grandson attempting to exonerate his grandfather of 
the onus of failure by railing against the vagaries of Fate. My interpretation 
of the Battle of Kalavrye serves to align Alexios’ tactics with what we know 
of his career generally, reconciling what would otherwise emerge as an 
uncharacteristically reckless engagement by the young general with what 
we know of his style of generalship. 
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Και παλι για την Μαχη της Καλαβρυης
Στο άρθρο επανεξετάζονται τα σχετικά με την μάχη της Καλαβρύης 
(1078), της κρίσιμης αυτής αντιπαράθεσης μεταξὺ Αλεξίου Κομνηνού και 
Νικηφόρου Βρυεννίου, και προτείνεται μία άλλη ερμηνεία για την εξέλιξή 
της. Η σύγχρονη βιβλιογραφία βασίζεται στην εξιστόρηση του νεωτέρου 
Νικηφόρου Βρυεννίου στην Ύλη Ιστορίας, με σύντομες αναφορές στα 
λίγα σημεία διαφοροποίησης που υπάρχουν στην αφήγηση της Άννας 
Κομνηνής στην Αλεξιάδα, και η ακρίβειά της θεωρείται δεδομένη. 
Έχει αγνοηθεί όμως σε μεγάλο βαθμό η λίγο παλαιότερη εκδοχή 
που παρουσιάζει ο Μιχαήλ Ατταλειάτης. Στο άρθρο επιχειρείται να 
αποδειχθεί ότι μία βασική λεπτομέρεια που αναφέρεται στην σύγχρονη 
βιβλιογραφία –η αιφνίδια άφιξη των Τούρκων μισθοφόρων που έγειρε 
την πλάστιγγα υπέρ του Αλεξίου– βασίζεται στην παράδοση της Ύλης 
Ιστοριών και της Αλεξιάδας, δεν επαληθεύεται όμως από την Ιστορία 
του Μιχαήλ Ατταλειάτη. Η αναφορά σε «αιφνίδια άφιξη» των Τούρκων 
μισθοφόρων οφείλεται σε παρερμηνεία της τακτικής του Αλεξίου: οι 
Τούρκοι ήσαν εξ αρχής παρόντες στο πεδίο της μάχης.  
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